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Mexican immigrants account for a third of all foreign born residents in the United States and are the
fastest growing immigrant group. In 2008, it is estimated that 12.7 million Mexican immigrants lived
in the U.S. and this ￿gure represents approximately 4 percent of the U.S. population and 11 percent
of Mexico￿ s population.1 Understanding the pattern of self-selection among Mexican immigrants
to the United States is relevant for both research and policy. Given the magnitudes involved,
selective migration out of Mexico may have large e⁄ects on the Mexican labor force. If migrants
are negatively selected on skills (i.e., come from the lower end of the skill distribution), then this
will tend to reduce the relative scarcity of high skilled labor and reduce earnings disparities between
high and low-skilled workers in Mexico. Positive selection of migrants would have opposite e⁄ects.
The skill-composition of Mexican immigrants in the United States also has important implications
for U.S. labor market and immigration policy. Negative selection of Mexican immigrants will tend
to reduce the wages of low-skilled native-born persons and exacerbate earnings inequality, although
the evidence in support of this hypothesis remains controversial (Borjas, Katz and Freeman, 1996;
Lalonde and Topel, 1997; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005). Finally, studying the pattern of self-selection
from Mexico can serve as a useful test of Borjas￿ s (1987) canonical model of migration. Given
the documented higher returns to schooling and greater dispersion of wages in Mexico than in
the United States, Borjas￿theory predicts that Mexican migrants to the United States would be
less-skilled than their counterparts who remain in Mexico. However, this prediction has not always
been supported by empirical evidence in previous studies.
This paper uses data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to examine the nature
of selection of Mexican migrants to the United States. The MxFLS is ideally suited to study
the pattern of selection of migrants. The 2002 baseline survey of the MxFLS contains detailed,
individual-level information on education, labor market participation and earnings, past migration
experience, migration networks, credit availability, assets, and cognitive ability for a nationally
1Fact Sheet: Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 2008; Pew Hispanic Center,
http://pewhispanic.org/￿les/factsheets/47.pdf, website last accessed 2/4/10
2representative sample of Mexicans. Most important, there is information about whether individuals
migrated to the United States by the time of the second round survey in 2006. Thus, we observe
earnings, education, and other components of labor market skills for both migrants and non-
migrants prior to their migration from Mexico to the United States. Using the MxFLS enables us
to address many of the data limitations that have plagued earlier studies. For example, studies that
used the U.S. Census may miss many Mexican migrants because of the undercounting of immigrants,
and these studies may overstate the education of migrants if immigrants obtain additional schooling
after arrival in the U.S. Other studies that have used Mexican surveys generally miss individuals
in households in which all members have migrated to the United States. Furthermore, the MxFLS
provides information on aspects of skills such as cognitive ability that are usually unmeasured, as
well as a rich set of individual and household characteristics that can help control for other potential
costs and bene￿ts associated with the migration decision.
We ￿nd, in line with the previous literature, that Mexican migrants are selected from the middle
of the education distribution, or what has been referred to as ￿intermediate￿selection. However,
there is no evidence for selection on another dimension of skill, namely cognitive ability. We also
demonstrate that migrants are selected from the middle of the distribution of observed skills, as
measured by predicted wages. In contrast, we ￿nd little consistent evidence of selection of migrants
on unobserved skill. Our ￿ndings are quite di⁄erent once we control for proxy variables for the
costs of migration. In this case, estimates suggest no signi￿cant selection of migrants on observed
skill, although estimates are somewhat imprecise. The substantial change in the pattern of selection
when these controls for the costs of migration are included raises the possibility that analyses with
more complete controls would yield evidence of negative selection. With respect to unobserved
skill, adding controls for the costs of migration has little e⁄ect on estimates, and estimates suggest
essentially no selection on unobserved skill.
Finally, we present direct evidence to support the canonical model of migration (Borjas, 1987).
We ￿nd that Mexican males are more likely to migrate to the U.S. when the return to observed
skill is larger in the U.S. than in Mexico in ways consistent with theory. In addition, we show that
3proxy variables for the cost of migration are strongly correlated with the probability of migrating
and correlated with observed skill; controlling for these costs diminishes, even eliminates, evidence
of selection from the middle of the observed skill distribution.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature on the self-selection
of Mexican migrants. Section 3 outlines a simple model of migration in which mobility costs are
allowed to vary with schooling and with unobserved skills. Section 4 describes the data from the
Mexican Family Life Survey and the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our ￿ndings on the
selection of migrants by observed and unobserved skills. Section 6 discusses these results in light
of previous research, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are only a few papers that have examined the pattern of selection on skills among Mexican
immigrants to the United States. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) used the 1990 and 2000 Mexican
and U.S. Censuses to evaluate the selection of Mexican immigrants in terms of observable skills and
found evidence of ￿intermediate￿selection, which is inconsistent with Borjas￿ s model given what is
known about the returns to education in Mexico and the U.S.2 Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) ￿rst
compared educational attainment of non-migrants in Mexican Census to migrants in the 2000 U.S.
Census, and showed that Mexican immigrants in the United States are drawn from the middle of
the Mexican education distribution. Next, they compared the (predicted) wage distribution for
residents of Mexico with the (predicted) wage distribution of Mexican immigrants in the United
States had they been paid according to the skills prices in Mexico. Wages were predicted using
age, education, and marital status and used as a proxies for observed skill. As with education,
they found that migrants are concentrated in the middle of Mexico￿ s (predicted) observed skill
distribution.
The use of the U.S. and Mexican Censuses presents several empirical problems for Chiquiar and
2Feliciano (2005) used the Mexican and U.S. Censuses and reported positive selection on education of Mexican
migrants. On average, migrants had one to two years more education than non-migrants depending on the year (1960,
1970, 1990, 2000). Feliciano only examined mean di⁄erences and not di⁄erences in the entire education distribution.
4Hanson (2005): the likely undercount of immigrants in the U.S. Census; the possibility that Mexican
immigrants can obtain additional schooling after arriving in the United States; return migration;
and the likelihood that unobservable characteristics are correlated with education. Results remained
relatively unchanged after addressing these potential problems, but despite their comprehensive
assessments, these concerns cannot be completely alleviated.
Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) used the 2000 Mexican Census to estimate di⁄erences in the
educational attainment between migrants and non-migrants. They replicated Chiquiar and Han-
son￿ s (2005) ￿nding that Mexican immigrants in the 2000 U.S. Census have more education (and
are older) than non-migrants in the Mexican Census. However, they further investigated potential
over-reporting of education by migrants and undercounting of younger migrants in the U.S. Census.
Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) exploited the fact that, in the Mexican Census, heads of households
were asked to list current or past household members who had lived abroad during the preceding
￿ve years. Unfortunately, the heads of household only reported a limited set of individual charac-
teristics: age, gender, Mexican state of origin, and migration patterns. Since no information about
educational attainment of migrants was available, the authors used measured characteristics to
predict educational attainment. In contrast to Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), they found evidence
of negative selection on education; low-educated Mexicans were more likely than high-educated
Mexicans to migrate to the United States, and the degree of negative selection was larger in regions
with higher returns to schooling. However, this approach is based on the assumption that there
are no di⁄erences between migrants and non-migrants beyond those measured by the limited set of
characteristics used to predict education.
FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga (2008) used data from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Trimestral
(ENET) survey to overcome some of the limitations associated with using Census data. The ENET
survey follows households for ￿ve consecutive quarters and includes reports on whether any house-
hold member has left for the United States. Consequently, it is possible to examine the selectivity of
migrants on their education attainment and actual earnings prior to migration. FernÆndez-Huertas
Moraga found negative selection on wages and ￿intermediate to negative selection￿on education
5for men aged 16 to 65. The ENET is not subject to the problems of undercounting of migrants
and over-reporting of migrant educational attainment that are present in U.S. Census. However,
this approach misses persons in households in which all members have migrated to the United
States.3 Furthermore, as we discuss later, the inclusion of younger men aged 16 to 20 is potentially
problematic given their low rates of labor market participation and lack of information on wages.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) used data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) to examine
how various factors in￿ uence the selectivity of undocumented migrants over time.4 They found that
migrants were drawn from the middle of the education distribution. They did not examine other
measures of skill. While the MMP includes both migrants and non-migrants living in Mexico,
it does not include Mexican-born household heads who have migrated to the U.S. permanently.
Furthermore, the data from the MMP are collected retrospectively, which may result in recall bias.
Finally, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) used data from the 1997 Encuesta Nacional de la
DinÆmica DemogrÆ￿ca (ENADID) survey to examine selection of Mexican migrants on education.5
The survey has information on migrants in the U.S. who have a (coresident) family member living
in Mexico but misses migrants who have permanently left Mexico and who do not have family
member that remained in Mexico. The main contribution of McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) was
incorporating the migration history of the community, as a measure of the cost of migration, into
the analysis. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) reported that migrants are negatively selected on
education in communities that have a high proportion of persons who migrated, but that selection
on education is positive in communities that do not have high rates of migration.
This brief review of the literature highlights the signi￿cant data limitations associated with
previous research on the pattern of selection of Mexican migrants to the U.S. All the papers re-
viewed above have developed novel and innovative uses of data to address the question of migrant
3As noted by FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga (2008), individuals moving to the US with their entire household are
more likely to have higher education and wages creating a bias towards negative selection.
4Munshi (2003) also uses the MMP to show that Mexican migrants are more likely to be employed and hold a
higher paying job when their network in the United States is larger.
5Durand et. al. (2001) also use the ENADID survey to show that Mexican migrants have become more negatively
selected over time after controlling for cohort e⁄ects (though still predominantly drawn from the middle of the
education distribution).
6self selection, but ultimately, these studies are subject to legitimate criticism related to problems
of measurement and data availability. In this paper, we add to this literature by studying the
question of immigrant selection using arguably the most appropriate data available.6 As noted
earlier, the MxFLS is not subject to some of the potentially serious problems that have a⁄ected
previous work. Speci￿cally, the MxFLS allows us to identify all migrants, even those that have
permanently moved to the U.S. Studies that use the Mexican Census (Ibarraran and Lubotsky
2007), the MMP (Orrenius and Zavodny 2005), the ENADID (McKenzie and Rapoport 2007),
or the ENET (FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga, 2008) do not observe most permanent migrants. The
MxFLS also avoids the potential undercount of Mexican migrants in the U.S. Census, which is the
data source used by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). Further, the MxFLS does not depend on recall to
identify migrants and time of migration like the MMP. Perhaps most importantly, the MxFLS has
information on earnings of migrants before they have left Mexico, as well as proxies for the costs
of migration. Thus, we can examine selection on both observed and unobserved skills of Mexican
migrants while attempting to control for the costs of migration, something which has not been done
by previous studies.7
3 Theory
In order to motivate the empirical analysis, this section presents a model of migration based on
Borjas (1987, 1991).8 In our version of the model, mobility costs are allowed to vary with schooling
and with unobserved skills.9 Individuals from Mexico, indexed by 0, choose whether or not to
6Rubalcava, et al. (2008) use these same data to examine the health selectivity of migrants to the US. They also
report the absence of any di⁄erential selection on education when measured as a linear function of years of schooling.
This is consistent with our ￿ndings since the pattern of intermediate selection is only apparent when allowing for a
non-linear functions of schooling.
7Gould and Moav (2008) examine selection on both observed and unobserved skills for Israeli migrants. They ￿nd
positive selection on education and intermediate selection on residual wages. However, it is important to note that
the relative returns to education and unobserved skills are very di⁄erent between the United States and Israel, as
compared to between Mexico and the United States.
8Grogger and Hanson (2008) provide an alternative model of immigration where the decision to migrate is based
on a linear (utility) function of wages rather than log (utility) function of wages. The key di⁄erence between their
model and the model presented in this paper is that migration decisions depend on di⁄erences in wage levels between
source and destination country in addition to di⁄erences in the return to skill in the source and destination country.
9See McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) for a similar model that allows migration costs to be correlated with skill.
7migrate to the United States, indexed by 1, on the basis of their potential earnings net of moving
costs. For simplicity, we treat this as a one-time decision. Residents of Mexico earn a wage given
by:
ln(w0) = ￿0 + ￿0s + "0; (1)
where w0 is the wage in Mexico, ￿0 is the base wage in the absence of any schooling, s is the
level of schooling, ￿0 is the return to schooling in Mexico, and "0 is independent of s and normally
distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
0. If the population of Mexico were to migrate to the
United States, they would earn a wage given by:
ln(w1) = ￿1 + ￿1s + "1; (2)
where w1 is the wage of Mexican migrants in the United States, ￿1 is the base wage without
schooling, ￿1 is the return to schooling for Mexicans in the United States, and "1 is independent
of s and normally distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
1. The random variables "0 and "1
may be correlated with correlation coe¢ cient, ￿, which is the degree to which unmeasured skills
of Mexican migrants are similarly valued in both Mexico and the United States. The education
distribution of the population of Mexico can be written as:
s = ￿s + "s (3)
where "s is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
s.
Equations (1) and (2) completely describe the earnings opportunities facing a potential migrant
from Mexico. Combining these two equations and assuming the presence of migrations costs,
denoted in time-equivalent units by ￿, implies that a resident from Mexico will migrate to the
United States if
I = ln(w1) ￿ ln(w0) ￿ ￿ = (￿1 ￿ ￿0) + [(￿1 ￿ ￿0)s ￿ ￿] + ("1 ￿ "0) > 0: (4)
8We depart from the assumption of constant migration costs and suppose that mobility costs can
be written as:
￿ = ￿￿ + ￿￿s + "￿; (5)
where ￿￿ is the mean level of mobility costs in the population, ￿￿ captures the relationship between
schooling and mobility costs, and "￿ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
￿. The
random variable "￿ may be correlated with "1 and "0, with the correlation coe¢ cients given by ￿￿0
and ￿￿1 respectively. This implies that the rate of emigration from Mexico to the United States is
given by:
P = Prf("1 ￿ "0) + (￿1 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿)"s + "￿ > ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿0) + (￿1 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿)￿s ￿ ￿￿g
= 1 ￿ ￿(z￿) (6)
where t = ("1 ￿ "0 + "￿) + (￿1 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿)"s, and z￿ = ￿[(￿1 ￿ ￿0) + (￿1 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿)￿s ￿ ￿￿]=￿t.
Given this framework, it is straightforward to show that the conditional expectation of schooling
for Mexicans who migrate to the United States is:





(￿1 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿)￿; (7)
where ￿ = ￿(z￿)=P: In other words, the schooling level of Mexican migrants will be equal to the
mean level of schooling of non-migrants plus the selection e⁄ect, which depends on the di⁄erence
in the return to schooling between the U.S. and Mexico, and on the relationship between migra-
tion costs and schooling. If we assume that migration costs are constant across di⁄erent levels
of schooling, so that ￿￿ = 0, the standard comparative statics would apply: there would be pos-
itive selection in schooling when (￿1 ￿ ￿0) > 0 because highly educated individuals from Mexico
would be more highly rewarded in the U.S. labor market, and negative selection in schooling when
(￿1 ￿ ￿0) < 0 because these highly educated individuals would earn more by remaining in Mexico.
9However, if migration costs are inversely related to schooling, such that ￿￿ < 0, we may observe
positive selection even in the case that (￿1 ￿ ￿0) < 0. Note that by conditioning on migration costs,
E (s j ￿;I > 0), we return to the case where the degree of selection depends only on the relative
returns to schooling between Mexico and the United States.
Now consider selection based on unobserved skill, ". We can write the expectation of log wages
in Mexico conditional on the observed level of schooling and the decision to migrate as follows:













Hence, the nature of selection on unobserved skill depends on whether the dispersion in the return
to unobserved skill in the United States is greater than the dispersion in the return to unobserved
skill in Mexico, ￿0=￿1, the correlation between the returns to unobserved skill in the United States
and Mexico, ￿, as well as the correlation between migration costs and unobserved skill in Mexico,
￿￿0. Again, if we were to assume that migration costs are uncorrelated with unobserved skill, so
that ￿￿ = 0, the standard comparative statics would apply. For a su¢ ciently high value of ￿, we
should observe positive selection in unobserved skill when there is greater inequality of the returns
to unobserved skill in the United States than in Mexico, and negative selection when there is greater
inequality of the return to unobserved skill in Mexico than in the United States.10
However, if migration costs are correlated with unobserved skill, then the type of selection
generated may be in either direction. A positive correlation between migration costs and unobserved
skills increases the likelihood of negative selection whereas a negative correlation between migration
costs and unobserved skill increases the likelihood of positive selection. Note, once more, that by
conditioning on migration costs, E (lnw0 j ￿;s;I > 0), we return to the case where the degree of
selection depends only on whether the dispersion in the return to unobserved skill in the United
States is greater than the dispersion in the return to unobserved skill in Mexico, ￿0=￿1, and the
correlation between the returns to skills in the United States and Mexico, ￿.
10Note that a small or negative value for ￿ implies that migrants will have below-average earnings in Mexico but
above-average earnings in the United States (what Borjas refers to as ￿refugee selection￿ ).
10To summarize, this simple model based on Borjas (1987) has a few, well-known empirical
implications. First, the nature of the selection of Mexican migrants on observed skills depends on
the di⁄erence in the return to skill (e.g., education) in the U.S. and Mexico, and the correlation
between the costs of migration and observed skill. Consider the case in which skill is measured
by education. Previous studies, and our own estimates, from the Mexican and U.S. Censuses have
documented that the return to education is higher in Mexico than in the U.S. Thus, holding costs of
migration constant, theory predicts that Mexican migrants will be negatively selected on education.
However, if costs of migration are not held constant, then Mexican migrants may be negatively or
positively selected on education (or selected from the middle of the education distribution). Similar
arguments apply to more multi-dimensioned measures of skill such as those that also include age
and, in our case, cognitive ability. The other prediction from the model is that, holding costs of
migration constant, selection on unobserved skill depends on the relative dispersion of the returns to
unobserved skills in the U.S. and Mexico. Again, allowing costs of migration to di⁄er by skill makes
the prediction ambiguous. The following section describes the data and the empirical strategy used
to test this model.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data
The Mexican Family Life Survey is a longitudinal household survey that is representative at the
national, urban-rural and regional level. The ￿rst round of the survey was conducted from April
to July 2002 and collected information from a sample of approximately 8,400 households or 35,000
individuals across 150 di⁄erent communities in 16 of Mexico￿ s 32 states.11 The baseline survey
included both household information and individual-level information for all members living in the
household. The survey covered many areas: educational attainment, labor market participation and
earnings, past migration experiences, assets, credit availability, and cognitive ability. The second
11See http://www.ennvih-mx￿ s.org/ for more details.
11round of the survey was begun in mid-2005 and completed in 2006, with a 90 percent re-contact
rate. Those who had migrated to the United States were contacted at a rate of over 91 percent.
Although information from the second round interviews of migrants to the United States has not yet
been released, an indicator for whether the individual has moved to the United States is available
in the public-use data; note that all migrants should be identi￿ed even if they could not be found
in the second round.12
We restrict the sample to males aged 21 to 65 in the ￿rst round of the MxFLS.13 Table 1
presents unweighted summary statistics for this sample. Panel A indicates that the fraction who
migrated to the United States over the three year period prior to the second round of the MxFLS
is 3.63 percent, or 295 out of 8,116 men.14 This rate of migration is consistent with other sources.
Hanson and McIntosh (2010) used consecutive Mexican Censuses to estimate migration rates and
reported 10-year migration rates of approximately 12-14 percent for young men in their 20s and
5-10 percent for men in their 30s. In our sample, the 3-year migration rates for men in their
20s and 30s are 5.6 percent and 3.3 percent respectively, and are therefore consistent with those
reported by Hanson and McIntosh (2010). Passel and Cohn (2009) used CPS data to estimate
that approximately 550,000 Mexican immigrants arrived in the US each year between 2003 and
2006. This ￿gure represents about 1.1 percent of the non-elderly adult population of Mexico. In
the MxFLS, approximately 2.8 percent of the baseline adult (male and female) sample migrated
between 2002 and 2005, which is roughly equivalent to the annual rate reported by Passel and
Cohn.
The variables in Panels B and C are from the ￿rst round of the MxFLS in 2002, reported by the
head of household (or other knowledge person in the household) and the individual, respectively.
12In cases where entire households were no longer present at the original address, the interviewers searched for the
￿nal destination of that particular household. This was aided by information collected in the ￿rst round of the survey
where in the case of the household were to move, the address and telephone number of close relatives (including those
living in the United States) could assist in providing current household information.
13An analysis of female migration is complicated by the fact that the migration decision is more likely to be tied to
spouse and labor market participation is substantially lower making it more di¢ cult to compare wages. This latter
point also applies to the analysis of men younger than 21 years of age (as shown in Appendix B).
14This includes 217 men who were residing in the United States and 78 men who moved to the United States
but returned to Mexico by time of the second round. We do not exclude return migrants because they migrated
subsequent to the baseline survey and their decision to return to Mexico is likely to be based partly on ex-post
realizations of their experiences in the United States.
12The main variables from Panel B used in the empirical analysis are age, marital status, and the
total value of household assets. But we also show that average years of schooling and the proportion
working in the sample, as reported by the head of household, are very similar to reports by the
individuals themselves. The proportion of our sample living in rural areas is about 50 percent
which is somewhat higher than the 41 percent of an analogous sample in the 2000 Mexican Census.
However, the average years of schooling in our sample is almost identical to the 7.27 years of
schooling reported for a similar sample of men aged 21 to 65 in 2000 Mexican Census. The MxFLS
also provides information on cognitive ability, a dimension of skill that is usually unmeasured in
most data sets. Cognitive ability is measured as the number of correct responses to 12 multiple-
choice questions of a Raven￿ s (1983) Progressive Matrices test. In addition, the MxFLS contains
unique information on plausible proxies for the costs of migration (presence of relatives in the US,
past migration experience, US documentation) and credit constraints (household assets, individual
savings, and availability of credit).
We focus on individual reports of annual earnings because these include several important
categories, such as pro￿t-sharing and Christmas bonuses, which are omitted in individual reports
of monthly earnings.15 Moreover, since all of the individual interviews were conducted between
April and July, monthly earnings may be subject to seasonal variation. We include earnings in
the main job as well as any earnings received from a secondary job, and use proxy reports to
complete any missing information.16 Nevertheless, we will assess the sensitivity of our ￿ndings to
excluding proxy reports, excluding imputed values, and calculating earnings and wages on the basis
of monthly earnings. We also calculate hourly wages based on the total number of hours worked
throughout the year (as number of weeks worked during the year multiplied by the usual hours
worked per week).17 The average hourly wage based on annual earnings for our sample is about
15Federal law requires ￿rms to participate in a pro￿t sharing program in which employees receive 10 percent of
the ￿rm￿ s annual pro￿ts. Firms are also required to pay a year-end Christmas bonus (Aguinaldo) to all employees
equivalent to at least two-weeks pay.
16Proxy reports account for approximately 10-15 percent of observations for most variables. For individuals who
are working but do not report positive earnings, we impute earnings based on age, years schooling, marital status,
urban status, state ￿xed e⁄ects and earnings information as reported by the head of household.
17We drop outliers that appear to be data errors. Speci￿cally, we trim individuals with hourly wages less than 0.1
and greater than 1000 pesos. This accounts for approximately 0.5 percent of the sample.
1317 pesos which is similar to the 18 pesos an hour based on monthly earnings in the 2000 Mexican
Census. Appendix A describes the construction of all the variables in Table 1 in greater detail.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
The MxFLS data is ideally suited to test the predictions of the Borjas (1987, 1991) model in the
context of Mexican migration to the United States. To do so, we ￿rst describe the nature of se-
lection of migrants separately for three observed measures of skills: education, age and cognitive
ability. In particular, we examine the proportion of migrants from di⁄erent parts of the educa-
tion distribution, age distribution, and cognitive ability distribution. We also compare the wage
distributions of migrants and non-migrants. This exercise essentially replicates earlier studies ex-
amining the observable characteristics of Mexican migrants to the U.S., but takes advantage of a
representative survey that does not undercount certain types of Mexican migrants.
The preceding analysis considers each observable skill separately and ignores the price of these
skills in the labor market. We therefore proceed to price out observed skills and analyze the nature
of selection using an index of observed skills, as measured by predicted wages. Predicted wages
are obtained using various combinations of observed skills, beginning with just education, adding
age, and ￿nally introducing a measure of cognitive ability. The wage models are estimated using a
saturated model that include all interactions between the di⁄erent aspects of observed skill. The
di⁄erence between migrants and non-migrants in observed skill are assessed using the following
regression model:
Pr(mi = 1) = ￿0 + ￿1Oi + ￿i; (9)
where mi is an indicator variable for having migrated to the United States and Oi is an index
of observed skills. We carry out this analysis by collapsing our measures of education, age, and
cognitive ability into di⁄erent categories. For example, we construct the index of observable skill
based on education, age, and cognitive ability by regressing wages on the full set of interactions







￿labilityli + ￿i; (10)
and forming predicted wages on the basis of the estimated coe¢ cients so that Oi = ￿b ￿jeducji ￿
￿b ￿kageki ￿ ￿b ￿labilityli. If there is negative selection of migrants in terms of observable skills, the
coe¢ cient on our index of observable skills would be negative indicating that migrants are over-
represented among Mexicans with below-average skills and underrepresented among the Mexicans
with above-average skills. In fact, we consider ￿ exible speci￿cations of Oi by including indicator
variables for di⁄erent quantiles of the predicted wage distribution that allow us to pick up non-linear
patterns of selection.
We then conduct a similar analysis of the selection of migrants by unobserved skill by estimating
an analogous regression model:
Pr(mi = 1) = ￿0 + ￿1Ui + ￿i; (11)
where Ui = b ￿i is unobserved skill measured as the residual of wages when regressed on our set of
observable skills. Again, we consider ￿ exible speci￿cations of Ui by including indicator variables
for di⁄erent quintiles of the residual wage distribution that allow us to pick up non-linear patterns
of selection.18 Note that it is only because the MxFLS has earnings information for migrants while
they are still in Mexico that we can conduct the analysis of selection on unobserved skill.
Finally, we re-assess the nature of selection on observed and unobserved skills with additional
controls for the costs of migration, the availability of credit, as well as community ￿xed e⁄ects.
According to the theory, we expect to see greater evidence of negative selection when migration
costs are included than when they are not included. To the extent that some individuals face binding
liquidity constraints, adding measures of credit availability may also a⁄ect the nature of selection.
Community ￿xed e⁄ects should capture any di⁄erences across communities that may be correlated
with migration decisions. While certain communities may be associated with di⁄erent costs of
18For simplicity, we estimate equations 9 and 11 using a linear probability model but our results are robust to
probit and logit speci￿cations.
15migration, there are likely to be important di⁄erences in terms of relative returns to observed and
unobserved skills across communities (as documented by Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2007).
5 Results
5.1 Selection of Migrants on Age, Education, Ability and Earnings
We begin by describing the nature of selection of migrants by education, age, cognitive ability
and earnings. Table 2 shows the proportion of migrants and non-migrants across ￿ve education
categories, ￿ve age categories, four categories of cognitive ability, as well as earnings and wage
quintiles. On average, migrants are younger than non-migrants, and there is a steep gradient in
the likelihood of migrating by age. Compared to non-migrants, migrants are signi￿cantly over
represented among those aged 21 to 29, and signi￿cantly under represented among those aged 48
to 65. For example, 44 percent of all migrants are aged 21 to 29 as compared to 28 percent of
non-migrants.
With respect to education, Table 2 indicates that migrants are signi￿cantly over represented in
the middle of the education distribution, similar to the ￿ndings in Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and
Orrenius and Zavodny (2005). Among migrants, 32 percent have seven to nine years of schooling
compared to 25 percent of non-migrants. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the probability of migrat-
ing disaggregated by each year of schooling, with the solid line depicting a quadratic ￿t to the
probability of migrating (estimated at the individual level). The general pattern of results is the
same￿ greater probability of migrating among those in the middle of the education distribution
than those at either the top or bottom of the distribution￿ but there is somewhat less uniformity
to the pattern than suggested by estimates in Table 2.19
In contrast to age and education, migrants di⁄er very little from non-migrants on cognitive
ability. Table 2 reveals that the proportions of migrant and non-migrants are virtually identical
across di⁄erent categories of cognitive ability. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the probability of
19Speci￿cally, among those with zero years of schooling, the migration probability is approximately four percent
and about equal to the probability of migration among those with six, eight and nine years of schooling, and greater
than the probability of migrating among those with ten, twelve and more years of schooling.
16migrating for a more disaggregated measure of cognitive test score (and again, the solid line depicts
the quadratic ￿t to the proportion of migrants by cognitive ability score). The absence of any dif-
ference between migrants and non-migrants with respect to cognitive test scores is surprising given
the ￿ndings for education and the relatively high positive correlation between years of schooling
and cognitive test score (r=0.49).
Migrants are most heavily represented in the second quintile of the earnings distribution re-
gardless of whether earnings are measured on an annual or hourly basis. According to Table 2,
approximately 25 percent of migrants are in the second quintile compared to 19 percent of non-
migrants. Migrants are also signi￿cantly less likely than non-migrants to be found in the top quintile
of annual earnings. Panels A and B of Figure 2 show the distribution of (log) earnings for migrants
and non-migrants on an annual and hourly basis respectively.20 Both panels show that migrants
are more likely to be found in the middle of the earnings distributions than non-migrants. Panels
C and D plot the di⁄erence in the migrant and non-migrant distributions for (log) earnings and
(log) hourly wages, respectively. This ￿nding is similar to that of education, and is consistent with
the strong in￿ uence of education on earnings, even though wages include other components of skill.
Note that there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the probability of working between migrants and
non-migrants.
To summarize, estimates in Table 2, and the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 2, show
that Mexican migrants di⁄er from non-migrants along observable dimensions of skill, and that
migrants tend to be overrepresented in the middle of the education and earnings distributions.
Surprisingly, migrants and non-migrants tend to have similar distributions of cognitive test scores.
Migrants are also over represented among those 21 to 29 years of age and under represented among
those aged 48 to 65. The ￿nding of selection from the middle of the education and earnings
distributions is similar to some previous research, and is somewhat of a puzzle given that the
returns to education in Mexico are generally higher than in the U.S.21 Although the pattern of
20These densities are estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman￿ s (1986) optimal bandwidth, h =
0:9b ￿N






where S is the standard deviation, IQR is the interquartile range, and N is the
number of observations.
21Our calculations from the 2000 U.S. and Mexican Censuses indicate that returns to education in Mexico are
17selection by age is also potentially inconsistent with a simple model of migration, given that the
returns to age in Mexico are relatively higher among the middle-aged than among younger men
as compared to the U.S., the longer time horizon and potentially lower costs (in terms of family
attachments, etc.) probably explains much of why younger workers are so much more likely to
migrate. Table 2 also presents di⁄erences between migrants and non-migrants for a number of
variables that can serve as proxies for the costs of migration: marital status, whether a person has
a family member living in the U.S., whether a person has previously visited the U.S. whether a
person has U.S. documentation (visa, greencard, or passport), and whether a person has considered
moving to the U.S. All these variables are signi￿cantly di⁄erent between migrants and non-migrants
suggesting that these costs are important determinants of migration.
5.2 Selection of Migrants on an Index of Observed Skills
The preceding analysis considered each observable skill separately and ignored the price of these
skills in the labor market. In this section, we price out observed skills and examine whether
migrants and non-migrants di⁄er on an index of observed skills, measured by predicted wages.
As explained in the section 4.2, we construct this index of observed skill by regressing observed
wages on various combinations of age, education and cognitive test scores and forming a predicted
measure of wages (where age can be viewed as a proxy for experience). We then assess whether
the probability to migrate di⁄ers by the observed skill index, as measured by quintiles of predicted
wages (i.e., observed skills).22 We use two indices of predicted skill ￿one based on predicted annual
earnings and one based on predicted hourly wages ￿and construct each index three ways: using
only education to predict wages, using age and education (including all interactions) to predict
wages, and using age, education and cognitive test scores (including all interactions) to predict
wages.
higher than in the U.S. for the most educated and lower than in the U.S. for the least educated (0-3 years). Indeed,
the di⁄erences in the return to education between Mexico and the U.S. are increasing (in favor of Mexico) in years
of schooling.
22We have examined alternative speci￿cations, such as quartiles and tertiles, with similar results. Our ￿ndings also
hold with parametric speci￿cations that include non-linear (i.e. quadratic) terms in predicted wages.
18Table 3 presents the regression estimates of the association between the probability of migrating
and the index of observed skill distribution, as measured by predicted wages. Consider the estimates
in column (1) where we use only education to predict wages. For both annual earnings and hourly
wages, the estimates indicate that migrants are signi￿cantly more likely to come from the 3rd
quintile of the observed skill distribution than the 1st (bottom) quintile, and signi￿cantly less likely
to come from the 5th quintile than the 1st quintile of the observed skill distribution. The magnitudes
of the di⁄erences are relatively large. The probability of migrating is 0.013 percentage points, or 37
percent of the mean, greater in the 3rd quintile than the 1st quintile. These estimates are consistent
with estimates in Table 2 showing that migrants were signi￿cantly over represented among those
with seven to nine years of schooling and signi￿cantly under represented among those with 12 or
more years of schooling. This implies that restricting attention to the sample of wage earners does
not change the main ￿nding of selection from the middle of the education distribution. Further
note that we get similar results with the somewhat smaller sample of men with wage observations
as with the larger sample of men with information on years of schooling. This con￿rms that labor
market participation di⁄erences are not driving the ￿ndings for predicted wages.
Columns (2) and (3) show estimates of the association between the probability of migrating and
observed skill when the observed skill indices are constructed by using age and cognitive test scores
in addition to education to predict wages. In each case, migrants are signi￿cantly more likely to
come from the 3rd and 4th quintiles than the 1st quintile of the observed skill distribution. The
magnitudes of the di⁄erences here are also relatively large. The probability of migration is 0.015
(44 percent) to 0.023 (67 percent) greater in the 3rd and 4th quintiles than the 1st quintile. Overall,
these estimates, based on more comprehensive measures of observed skill, continue to show that
migrants are drawn disproportionately from the middle of the observed skill distribution.
5.3 Selection of Migrants on an Index of Unobserved Skills
One of the advantages of the MxFLS is that we observe earnings in Mexico for both migrants and
non-migrants, and we can use these earnings data to assess the nature of selection of migrants on
19unobserved skill as well as observed skills, which has not been previously studied. The unobserved
skill index is based on residual earnings ￿the portion of earnings orthogonal to measured aspects
of skill such as age, education and cognitive test scores. Thus, we can obtain estimates of the
association between the probability to migrate and the distribution of unobserved skills, as measured
by quintiles of residual earnings. Table 4 presents these estimates and it is structured analogously
to Table 3.
In contrast to our ￿ndings for observed skill, estimates in Table 4 indicate that the probability
of migrating is not signi￿cantly related to unobserved skill. These results imply that, for the most
part, migrants and non-migrants have similar distributions of unobserved skill. The exception is
among those in the 5th (top) quintile of unobserved skill, but only when unobserved skill is based
on residual annual earnings. In this case, the probability of migration among those in the 5th
quintile is signi￿cantly lower, approximately 50 percent of the mean, than in the 1st quintile. If we
consider the results in Tables 3 and 4 simultaneously, we can infer the source of the selection from
the middle of the wage distribution revealed in Figure 2. The over representation of migrants in the
middle of the wage distribution is due to the over representation of migrants in the middle of the
observed skill distribution, as there is relatively little di⁄erence in the distribution of unobserved
skill between migrants and non-migrants.
5.4 Proxies for the Costs of Migration and Di⁄erential Returns to Skill
The pattern of selection of migrants from the middle of the education distribution is inconsistent
with a simple model of migration that assumes constant costs of migration. The higher observed
return to education in Mexico compared to the U.S. implies negative selection, so we expect migrants
to be over represented in the bottom of the education distribution and under represented at the top
of the education distribution. However, it is unlikely that the costs of migration are constant, and
there are plausible reasons to expect the costs of migration to be negatively related with education
(Chiswick, 1999). For example, more educated individuals may ￿nd it easier to navigate the
bureaucratic procedures necessary to migrate legally to the U.S. or cover the ￿xed costs necessary
20to enter the U.S. (either legally or illegally). If the costs of migration are negatively related to
education, then ignoring such costs will make it more likely to observe positive (or less negative)
selection of migrants by education. The pattern of selection across the observed skill distribution
will likewise be a⁄ected by di⁄erential costs. Moreover, the Mexico-U.S. di⁄erence in the return to
observed skill may not be constant throughout the skill distribution. If the return to skill varies
over the distribution, then we would also expect the nature of the selection of migrants to vary over
the skill distribution.23
In this section, we examine the skill distributions of migrants and non-migrants conditional on
proxy variables for the cost of migration, and conditional on di⁄erences in the return to observed
skill between Mexico and the U.S. Table 5 shows the probability of migrating at di⁄erent quintiles
of the observed skill distribution with these additional controls for the full index of observed skill
based on education, age, and cognitive ability.24 Panel A presents estimates for observed skill
constructed using annual earnings, and Panel B presents estimates for observed skill constructed
using hourly wages. Estimates in column (1) of each panel are taken directly from Table 3 and are
presented to facilitate comparison with other estimates in Table 5.
Estimates in column (2) of Table 5 are based on regressions that include proxy variables for
the costs of migration. These variables include marital status, whether a person has a family
member living in the U.S., whether a person has previously visited the U.S. whether a person has
U.S. documentation (visa, greencard, or passport), and whether a person has considered moving
to the U.S. In both panels, the addition of controls for the costs of migration substantially changes
the pattern of selection on observed skills. Clearly, these proxy variables for costs of migration
are systematically related to the observed skill distribution and probability of migration, and the
￿nding of selection from the middle of the observed skill distribution is not robust to the inclusion
of such controls. Indeed, all of our proxies for the costs of migration are highly signi￿cant in
the expected directions (not shown). Comparing estimates in column (2) to those in column (1)
23Note, however, that if the return to observed skill is monotonically increasing in skill, then the selection from
the middle of the skill distribution reported in Table 3 cannot be solely explained by variation in the Mexico-U.S.
di⁄erences in the return to skill.
24The results in Table 3 are similar for an index of observed skill based on just education, or on education and age.
21reveals that the addition of proxy variables for the costs of migration signi￿cantly decreases the
association between the probability of migration and being in the 3rd and 4th quintiles of the
observed skill distribution (versus the 1st quintile). In fact, none of the estimates in column (2) are
statistically signi￿cant and most of the estimates are relatively small when measured against the
mean, although somewhat imprecise. Thus, including controls for the costs of migration provides
far less evidence for the selection of migrants from the middle of the observed skill distribution, and
raises the possibility that more complete controls for the costs of migration would actually reverse
the pattern of selection.
In column (3), we add controls for household assets and access to credit (whether individuals
know of any person or place where one can borrow or ask for a credit, and whether they have any
savings). Some have argued that the inability to ￿nance migration is an important determinant of
Mexican migration, and failure to consider this may a⁄ect the pattern of selection (Orrenius and
Zavodny 2005). Estimates in column (3) in Panels A and B of Table 5 are very similar to those in
column (1). Thus, for our measures of assets and credit, there is little evidence that these variables
play an important role in the nature of selection of migrants.
The next speci￿cation in Table 5 adds community ￿xed e⁄ects. The main motivation for this
speci￿cation is evidence regarding community-speci￿c di⁄erences in the return to skill (Ibarraran
and Lubotsky 2007). In addition, communities may di⁄er in the extent of migration networks
and other characteristics that are likely to alter the costs of migration (McKenzie and Rapoport
2007). It is unclear which of these two possibilities may be more important. Column (4) presents
estimates for this speci￿cation indicating that the probability of migration is signi￿cantly higher
for those in the 2nd to 5th quintiles than those in the 1st quintile. The magnitudes of the estimates
continue to suggest that migrants are disproportionately drawn from the middle of the observed skill
distribution, although the pattern of the associations between the probability of migration and the
observed skill distribution appears to be more of a step function than the inverted U-shape pattern
seen in column (1). However, it is clear that observed skill is highly correlated with community
￿xed e⁄ects.
22Theory predicts that the probability of migration depends on di⁄erences in the return to ob-
served skill between Mexico and the U.S. Accordingly, we calculated the return to observed skill
based on age and education for Mexican migrants in the U.S. (using the 2000 U.S. Census) and
residents of Mexico (using the 2000 Mexican Census). We include a full set of interactions between
our ￿ve education and ￿ve age categories. We then merge the di⁄erential in the estimated return
to skill by age and education categories, and include this di⁄erential in the regression model (while
clustering on age*education). The resulting estimates are shown in column (5) of Table 5. The
coe¢ cient on the Mexico￿ U.S. di⁄erential in the return to skill is positive and signi￿cant in both
panels, which is consistent with theory. A one standard deviation (0.44) increase in the relative
return to skill in Mexico versus the U.S. is associated with a 0.023 percentage point (69 percent
of mean) increase in the probability of migration. Moreover, estimates in column (5) are quite
similar to those in column (4); the probability of migration is signi￿cantly higher for those in the
2nd to 5th quintiles of the observed skill distribution than those in the 1st quintile. The similarity
of estimates in columns (4) and (5) suggest that community-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are be picking up
di⁄erences in the return to observed skill, consistent with the ￿ndings in Ibarraran and Lubotsky
(2007).
Finally, the estimates in column (5) suggest that di⁄erences in the costs of migration are strongly
correlated with observed skill and the probability of migration. This inference is plausible given
that the di⁄erential in the Mexico-U.S. returns to skill are included in the model. Thus, the
selection on observed skill revealed by estimates in column (5) is likely being driven by di⁄erences
in the costs of migration. Indeed, this hypothesis is supported by estimates in column (6) that
include both the di⁄erential in the Mexico-U.S. return to skills and proxy variables for the costs of
migration. Estimates in column (6) are substantially less positive than estimates in column (5), and
the di⁄erences between estimates in column (6) versus those in column (5) are similar to di⁄erences
between estimates in columns (2) versus column (1). In both cases, the addition of proxy variables
for the costs of migration weakens the pattern of selection from the middle of the observed skill
distribution, and provides more evidence in support of the standard prediction from theory.
23We also conduct a similar analysis as that represented by Table 5, but using residual wages as
an index of unobserved skill. Estimates from this analysis are presented in Table 6. In general, the
estimates in Table 6 are small (relative to the mean) and statistically insigni￿cant. There is little
evidence of selection on unobserved skill, which is similar to the conclusions we drew from Table 4.
The addition of proxy variables for the costs of migration and variables measuring assets and access
to credit had little e⁄ect on estimates of the associations between the probability of migrating and
quintiles of the unobserved skill distribution. The only signi￿cant associations are those between
belonging to the 5th (top) quintile of the distribution of unobserved skill based and the probability
of migration. Those in the top quintile of the unobserved skill distribution are signi￿cantly less
likely to migrate than those in the bottom quintile, although this is only true in the top panel
when unobserved skill is measured by residual annual earnings. The addition of community ￿xed
e⁄ects eliminates the signi￿cant association between being in the top quintile of the unobserved
skill distribution and the probability of migration.
In Appendix Table 1, we explore whether our results are robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations of
earnings and wages in the case of observed skill. Speci￿cally, we assess the sensitivity of our ￿ndings
to excluding information from proxy reports (by a knowledgeable member of the household), to
excluding imputed values for earnings and wages for individuals who are working but do not report
positive earnings, and to calculating earnings and wages on the basis of monthly earnings. Our
results are generally robust to these alternative speci￿cations. We observe selection from the middle
of the observed skill distribution when excluding controls for the costs of migration (columns 1, 3,
and 5), and more negative selection once controls for the costs of migration are included (columns
2, 4, and 6). Although not shown here, the results in Table 6 are also robust to these alternative
speci￿cations of earnings and wages.
6 Discussion
How do our ￿ndings relate to those reported in previous studies? In models that do not include
variables measuring the costs of migration, we ￿nd evidence for ￿intermediate￿selection of Mexican
24migrants on education and on an index of observed skill. These ￿ndings are similar to results
reported by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), and, with respect to
education, FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga (2008). However, Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) found
negative selection of migrants on education, and FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga (2008) found negative
selection of urban migrants on earnings (but positive selection of rural migrants on earnings).
Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) argue that their ￿nding is di⁄erent from Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005) because it corrects for certain data problems, speci￿cally, the undercount of migrants in U.S.
Census and over reporting of education of migrants in U.S. Census. FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga
(2008) also argues that the di⁄erence between his ￿ndings and the ￿ndings of Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005), at least in the case of urban migrants, is because of the undercount of migrants in the U.S.
Census.25 However, our data are not subject to this undercounting problem or to the problem of
over reporting of education, and yet we ￿nd ￿intermediate￿selection on both education and an
index of observed skill.
An explanation for the di⁄erence between our ￿ndings and those of FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga
(2008) may be related to di⁄erences in the samples used in each of our studies. Both the MxFLS and
the ENET are nationally representative samples, although the ENET misses migrants in households
in which all members have migrated to the United States. According to our data, approximately
13 percent of migrants moved to the United States together with their entire households and they
appear to be positively selected on education and wages. Nevertheless, because of the relatively
small fraction of migrants a⁄ected, this is unlikely to account for the large di⁄erences in our results.
More important is the inclusion of migrants aged 16 to 20 in the analysis conducted by FernÆndez-
Huertas Moraga (2008). We exclude these younger migrants in our sample because they have very
low rates of labor market participation. The fraction of young men aged 15 to 20 who report that
they are currently working is only 54 percent. There are also signi￿cant di⁄erences in labor market
participation by migrant status: those men who ended up migrating were 11 percentage points (or
25In addition, FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga (2008) notes that part of the discrepancy between his results and those
of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) may be due to negative selection on unobserved skill, but only o⁄ers indirect evidence
in support of this hypothesis.
2522 percent) more likely to work prior to migrating as compared to their counterparts who remain in
Mexico. Consequently, there is more evidence of negative selection on earnings and wages for these
younger men than in our main sample of 21 to 65 year olds. However, there are no substantial
di⁄erences between these samples in the pattern of selection on education. This suggests that
including younger men in the wage analysis may lead to substantial bias due to non-participation
and might explain the di⁄erence between our ￿ndings and those of FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga
(2008).
Our ￿ndings are also related to the debate over the role of the costs of migration that has been
prominent in the previous literature. For example, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) argue that their
￿nding of negative selection on education in communities with large migrant networks and positive
selection on education in communities with smaller migrant networks illustrates the important role
of costs of migration, and may be an explanation of inconsistent ￿ndings in other studies. However,
this interpretation depends on the relationship between the costs of migration due to education and
those due to migrant networks. Theory suggests that stratifying the sample by proxy variables for
migration costs such as the size of the migrant network should yield greater evidence for negative
selection on observed skill in both types of communities if these costs are unrelated to the costs
that can be overcome with education. Only if the presence of migrant networks eliminates all or
most costs, and education can compensate for the absence of migrant networks, would we expect
to ￿nd negative selection in one type of community and positive selection in the other. Similarly,
FernÆndez-Huertas Moraga (2008) reported negative selection on skill of migrants in urban areas,
but positive selection on skill of migrants in rural areas. An explanation for this pattern that
depends just on the costs of migration must assume that urban locations eliminate all or most
costs, and that education can compensate for such costs in a rural setting. Our results provide
greater clarity on this issue. We showed directly that costs of migration play an important role in the
migration decision, and that partially controlling for these costs results in signi￿cantly less evidence
of ￿intermediate￿selection on skills. Sample sizes prevent us from stratifying the sample based on
urban/rural status, but as we showed with respect to community ￿xed e⁄ects, urban/rural status
26and the size of migration network may be correlated with both di⁄erential returns to migration and
di⁄erent costs of migration. So stratifying the sample on the basis of community is not necessarily
a good test of the role of migration costs. Here, we used proxy variables for the costs of migration
directly, and found evidence consistent with theory.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented new evidence of the nature of selection of male, Mexican migrants to
the U.S. Our analysis was based on a new data source, the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS),
which is ideally suited to study the selection of Mexican migrants. Most importantly, the MxFLS
has information on the education, cognitive ability and earnings prior to migration of Mexican
migrants, including those in which the entire household migrated to the U.S. These data allow
us to examine the nature of selection on a more comprehensive measure of observed skill than
that used in previous studies, and to analyze the nature of selection on unobserved skill, which is
something no prior study has done directly. Furthermore, the MxFLS contains variables that are
good proxies for the costs of migration, and we use this information to help identify the pattern of
selection of migrants on skill.
In analyses that ignore the cost of migration, we found that male, Mexican migrants were more
likely to come from the middle of the distribution of observed skills regardless of whether observed
skill was measured by education; age and education; or age, education and cognitive ability. This
￿nding was robust to whether we measured observed skill using an index of skill based on annual
earnings or hourly wages. In contrast, we found little consistent evidence of selection of migrants
on unobserved skill as measured by residual earnings and wages.
Our ￿ndings are quite di⁄erent once we partly control for proxy variables for the costs of
migration. Adding controls for the costs of migration yields estimates that suggest no signi￿cant
selection of migrants on observed skill, although estimates are somewhat imprecise. Nevertheless,
the substantial change in the pattern of selection when partial controls for the costs of migration
are included raises the possibility that analyses with more complete controls would yield evidence
27of negative selection. Indeed, analyses that control for the di⁄erential in the return to observed skill
between Mexico and U.S., which makes the migration decision largely depend only on variation
in the costs of migration, indicate that variation in the costs of migration may be the dominant
determinant of migration. In this analysis, estimates indicate even stronger evidence of selection
from the middle of the observed skill distribution. Theoretically, this is due only to di⁄erences
in the costs of migration that are correlated with observed skill. Notably, adding controls for the
costs of migration to a model that includes di⁄erences in the return to observed skills between
Mexico and the U.S. again greatly diminishes the evidence in support of selection form the middle
of the observed skill distribution. With respect to unobserved skill, adding controls for the costs of
migration has little e⁄ect on estimates suggesting basically no selection on unobserved skill.
In sum, we presented substantial evidence to support the canonical model of migration. Mexican
males are more likely to migrate to the U.S. when the return to observed skill is larger in the U.S.
than in Mexico. Moreover, we showed that proxy variables for the cost of migration are strongly
correlated with the probability of migrating and correlated with observed skill, and that controlling
for these costs diminishes, even eliminates, evidence of selection from the middle of the observed
skill distribution. We hypothesize that more complete controls for the costs of migration may yield
even more evidence in support of the theoretical prediction of negative selection on skill.
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30A Data Appendix
This data appendix describes the construction of the main variables:
Migration status: The second round of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS-2) contains an indicator
for individuals who are currently residing in the United States. This is supplemented by information from
the migration modules in the second round of the survey on individuals who moved to the United States but
who returned to Mexico by time of the second round. This is based on a¢ rmative answers to the questions
￿Change of residence was to the United States?￿for those who indicate migrations of more than 12 months
since the ￿rst round and ￿Was the trip to the United States?￿for those who indicate moves of less than 12
months since the ￿rst round. Return migrants are not excluded because the decision to return to Mexico is
likely based on ex-post realizations of their experiences in the United States.
Education: Years of completed schooling is constructed on the basis of three di⁄erent questions reported
directly by individuals in book 3A: (1) ￿Which is/was the last level of schooling you attended?￿with responses
including ￿Without Instruction￿ , ￿Preschool or Kinder￿ , ￿Elementary￿ , ￿Secondary￿ , ￿Open Secondary￿ ,
￿High school￿ , ￿Open High school￿ , ￿Normal basic￿ , ￿College￿ , or ￿Graduate￿ ; (2) ￿Which is the last
schooling grade you completed?￿ ranging from ￿Did not complete the ￿rst grade￿ to ￿Seventh grade or
more￿ ; and (3) ￿Did you obtain the degree that certi￿es you are a graduate at that level?￿with responses
including ￿Yes, you graduated/have a degree￿ , ￿Not yet graduated￿ , and ￿Have not ￿nished all courses￿ .
Question (2) was only asked for those who last attended ￿Elementary￿ , ￿Secondary￿ , and ￿High school￿
while question (3) was only asked for those who last attended ￿Open Secondary￿ , ￿Open High school￿ ,
￿Normal basic￿ , ￿College￿ , and ￿Graduate￿ .
Years of completed schooling is taken as 0 for individuals who report ￿Without Instruction￿or ￿Preschool
or Kinder￿ . For individuals who report ￿Elementary￿ , years of completed schooling ranges from 0 to 6 based
on the number of grades completed (there are no responses for more than ￿sixth grade￿ ). For individuals
who report ￿Secondary￿ , years of completed schooling ranges from 6 to 9 based on the number of grades
completed (coding the less than 1% who report more than ￿third grade￿as 9). For individuals who report
￿High school￿ , years of completed schooling ranges from 9 to 12 based on the number of grades completed
(coding the less than 2.5% who report more than ￿third grade￿as 12). For individuals who report ￿Open
Secondary￿ , years of completed schooling is taken as 9 for those who graduated or have a degree, and 7
otherwise. Similarly, for individuals who report ￿Open High school￿or ￿Normal basic￿ , years of completed
schooling is taken as 12 for those who graduated or have a degree, and 10 otherwise. For individuals who
report ￿College￿ , years of completed schooling is taken as 16 for those who graduated or have a degree, and
14 otherwise. For individuals who report ￿Graduate￿ , years of completed schooling is taken as 18 for those
who graduated or have a degree, and 17 otherwise.
Years of completed schooling is also constructed on the basis of the roster reported on individuals by
the head of household (or whomever responds to the household interview). However, only questions (1)
and (2) were asked through the roster. Consequently, it is not possible to distinguish graduates from non-
graduates for those who last attended ￿Open Secondary￿ , ￿Open High school￿ , ￿Normal basic￿ , ￿College￿ ,
and ￿Graduate￿ . Instead, the proportion of graduates derived from the individual reports is used to impute
the average years of completed schooling for those reporting these categories, and these are rounded to the
nearest integer.
Employment: Information about whether individuals are working is based on four questions from book
3A (1): ￿What was your main activity last week?￿ ; (2) ￿During the past week, did you work (or develop
any activity that helped the household expenditure), for at least one hour?￿ ; (3)￿Did you work in a family
business (agricultural or non agricultural) either being paid or not, during the past week?￿ ; and (4) ￿Do
you have a job (or develop any activity that help the household expenditure), but didn￿ t attend it the past
week?￿ . Those who report that they ￿worked or carried out an activity that helped household expenditure￿
to question (1) or answer a¢ rmatively to any of the follow-up questions are coded as currently working.
Those who answer a¢ rmatively to another follow-up question, ￿In the last 12 months, have you worked (or
developed any activity to help household expenditures)?￿are added to those currently working and coded
as working during the past year. Finally, those who answer a¢ rmatively to the follow-up question ￿Have
you ever worked (or develop any activity that help the household expenditure)?￿are added to those who
have worked during the past year to form a indicator for having ever worked.
31Individuals who work are also asked to report the number of weeks worked in the past year, ￿What
is the total number of weeks that you worked as [main job] in the last year￿ and the number of hours
normally worked per week, ￿Normally, how many hours do you work as [main job] per week￿ . Employment
information is also constructed on the basis of the roster reported on individuals by the head of household
(or whomever responds to the household interview). The question is ￿During the last 12 months did (...)
work or develop any activity to help household expenditure￿and those who are reported in the a¢ rmative
are coded as employed.
Wages: Earnings in the primary and secondary jobs are reported by individuals for both the past month and
the past year in book 3A. For employees, rural laborors, agricultural and non-agricultural workers, earnings
are reported on the basis of the following questions (1) ￿How much did you earn last month, since [past
month date] until today, for working as [main job]?￿and (2) ￿How much did you earn in the last 12 months,
since [date 12 months ago] until today, for working as [main job]?￿ . For annual earnings in a primary job,
individuals were asked to provide the detailed amount in the following categories: wages or salary (after
taxes), piecework, commissions and tips, extra hours, christmas bonus, additional bonus, vacation premium,
pro￿t distribution, meals, housing, transportation, medical bene￿ts, and others. For monthly earnings in
a primary job, individuals were asked to provide the detailed amount in the following categories: wages or
salary (after taxes), piecework, commissions and tips, extra hours, meals, housing, transportation, medical
bene￿ts, and others. For earnings from secondary jobs, individuals were asked to report the total amount.
And if individuals did not provide a detailed breakdown for their primary job, they were also simply asked
to report the total amount. Monthly and annual earnings are taken as the sum of earnings from the primary
and secondary job, based on the detailed earnings or the total earnings depending on which was reported.
For business proprietors, employers, self-employed workers, and peasants who work on their own plot,
earnings are reported on the basis of the following questions (1) ￿How much money did you earn from
working as [main job] during the past month, since [past month date] until today?￿and (2) ￿How much
money did you earn from working as [main job] during the past 12 months, since [date 12 months ago] until
today?￿ . In each case, individuals report gross income/pro￿ts and net income/pro￿ts. Earnings for business
proprietors, employers, self-employed workers, and peasants who work on their own plot, are taken to be
equal to net income/pro￿ts, unless missing, in which case gross income/pro￿ts are used.
For individuals who are working but do not report positive earnings (approximately 20 percent of the
sample), we also calculate their imputed earnings based on age, years schooling, marital status, urban status,
state ￿xed e⁄ects and earnings information as reported by the head of household (based on the roster question
￿In the last 12 months, approximately how much did (...) earn or receive from his job or activity to help
household expenditure￿ ). We drop outliers that appear to be data errors. Speci￿cally, we trim individuals
with hourly wages less than 0.1 and greater than 1000 pesos. This accounts for approximately 0.5 percent
of the sample.
Other variables: Information on marital status and age is available from the roster ￿le. Household assets are
taken as the total value of all household asset categories by the head of household, which include dwellings
and land, bicycles, motorcycles and automobiles, electronic and kitchen appliances, savings and ￿nancial
assets, farming equipment, and livestock. Credit and borrowing information is available from individual
reports. An indicator for having the ability to borrow is based on an a¢ rmative answer to the question
￿Do you know any person or place where you can borrow or ask for a credit?￿ . An indicator for having any
savings is based on an a¢ rmative answer to the question ￿Do you have savings?￿ . Cognitive ability is based
on the number of correct responses to a Raven￿ s Progressive Matrices test with 12 multiple-choice questions.
An indicator for having a relative in the US is based on an a¢ rmative answer to the question ￿Do you
have any relative living in the US?￿ . Indicators for whether individuals visited the US in the past (i.e. prior
to the ￿rst round) is based on a¢ rmative answers to the questions ￿Change of residence was to the United
States?￿for those who indicate migrations of more than 12 months and ￿Was the trip to the United States?￿
for those who indicate moves of less than 12 months. An indicator for whether individuals have any US
documentation is based on those who respond to the question ￿At the moment of moving to [...], did you have
any document that allowed the entry into the USA?￿with ￿Visa￿ , ￿Green card￿ , or ￿American citizenship￿ .
An indicator for whether individuals have thought about moving to the US is based on those who answer
a¢ rmatively to the question ￿Have you thought about moving in the future, outside the locality/community
where you currently live?￿and respond with ￿United States￿to the follow-up question ￿Where do you think
32you could move to?￿ .
Proxy information: A proxy book was ￿elded to collect information about household members that could
not be interviewed in person, mainly because they were absent during the time of the ￿eldwork. Information
in the proxy is based on a more limited set of identical questions to those presented in the individual one-
on-one interviews, and provided by a household member knowledgeable about the absent member. Proxy
reports account for approximately 10-15 percent of observations for most variables.
33Notes:  Panel A plots migration rates for Mexican males aged 21 to 65 by years of schooling, with the solid line showing the 
quadratic relationship between the probability of migrating (estimated at the individual level) and measure of skill. Panel B 
plots migration rates for Mexican males aged 21 to 65 by cogntive ability score, with the solid line showing the analogous 
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Panel B: Migration Rates by Cognitive Ability
Figure 1: Migration Rates by Education and Cognitive AbilityNotes:  Panel A plots the density distribution of log annual earnings for migrants (dashed) and non-migrants (solid). Panel B 
plots the density distribution of log hourly wages for migrants (dashed) and non-migrants (solid). Panel C plots the difference 
in the densities of migrant and non-migrant annual earnings. Panel D plots the difference in the densities of migrant and non-
migrant hourly wages. All densities are estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman's (1986) optimal bandwidth. 
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Panel D: Difference in log hourly wages
Figure 2: Wage Distributions by Migration StatusTable 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard deviation Observations
Panel A: Migration information
Migrated to US between 2002-2005 0.036 0.187 8,116
Panel B: Roster reports
Age 38.9 12.222 8,116
Married 0.63 0.484 8,113
Rural 0.49 0.500 8,114
Years of schooling 7.29 4.192 8,057
Worked 0.911 0.284 8,114
Annual earnings 37,461 45,276 6,014
Household assets 751,680 10,400,000 7,530
Panel  C: Individual reports
Years of schooling 7.31 4.484 7,223
Cognitive ability (Raven's Progessive Matrices) 5.894 3.013 6,297
Relative in US 0.348 0.476 6,261
Visited US 0.043 0.203 7,231
Has US documents 0.014 0.117 6,234
Thought of moving to US 0.028 0.164 6,226
Know person/places to borrow 0.406 0.491 7,240
Have savings 0.157 0.364 7,240
Worked 0.901 0.299 7,221
Worked during past year 0.941 0.236 7,221
Ever worked 0.972 0.166 7,221
Total annual hours 2238.5 998.428 6,178
Annual earnings 28,192 42,201 5,924
Hourly wage 17.01 37.631 5,613
Notes: Information in Panel A is based on an indicator for whether the individual has moved to the United States, 
together with information on men who moved to the United States but returned to Mexico by time of the second round. 
Panel B contains information from the first round of the MxFLS and reported by the head of household (or other 
knowledge person in the household). Panel C contains information from the first round of the MxFLS and is reported by 
the individual directly, using proxy reports to complete any missing information. See Data Appendix for more details on 
the construction of these variable. All summary statistics are calculated for Mexican males aged 21 to 65, and are 
unweighted. Source: Mexican Family Life Survey.Table 2: Selected Characteristics by Migration Status
Migrants Non-migrants Difference
Age
   21-29 years old 0.441 0.277 0.163 ***
   30-38 years old 0.231 0.250 -0.020
   39-47 years old 0.207 0.205 0.002
   48-56 years old 0.078 0.157 -0.079 ***
   57-65 years old 0.044 0.110 -0.066 ***
Education
   0-3 years of schooling 0.202 0.239 -0.037
   4-6 years of schooling 0.301 0.262 0.040
   7-9 years of schooling 0.320 0.246 0.073 ***
   10-12 years of schooling 0.121 0.127 -0.006
   >12 years of schooling 0.055 0.126 -0.071 ***
Cognitive ability
   Bottom quartile 0.151 0.155 -0.005
   2nd quartile 0.307 0.306 0.000
   3rd quartile 0.307 0.314 -0.007
   Top quartile 0.236 0.224 0.012
Annual earnings
   1st (bottom) quintile 0.198 0.200 -0.002
   2nd quintile 0.252 0.192 0.060 *
   3rd quintile 0.238 0.204 0.033
   4th quintile 0.198 0.200 -0.002
   5th (top) quintile 0.114 0.204 -0.090 ***
Hourly wages
   1st (bottom) quintile 0.188 0.200 -0.013
   2nd quintile 0.255 0.198 0.057 **
   3rd quintile 0.188 0.200 -0.012
   4th quintile 0.188 0.201 -0.014
   5th (top) quintile 0.182 0.201 -0.018
Other variables
   Worked 0.882 0.902 -0.019
   Married 0.573 0.628 -0.055 *
   Relative in US 0.551 0.341 0.209 ***
   Visited US 0.165 0.038 0.127 ***
   Has US documents 0.039 0.013 0.026 ***
   Thought of moving to US 0.092 0.026 0.067 ***
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant differences between migrants and non-migrants at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. The sample is Mexican males aged 21 to 65 and unweighted. Source: Mexican Family Life 
Survey.Table 3: The Association between Predicted Earnings/Wages and Migration
dependent variable: migrated to the US
Predicted Annual Earnings Predicted Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd Quintile
0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.017** 0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
3rd Quintile
0.013* 0.026*** 0.016** 0.013* 0.031*** 0.015*
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
4th Quintile
-0.001 0.017** 0.018** 0 0.024*** 0.023***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
5th Quintile
-0.018*** -0.005 0.003 -0.018*** -0.001 0
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Predicting variables:
Education XXX X XX
Education*Age X X X X
Education*Age*Ability XX
Sample size 5826 5826 5826 5608 5608 5608
Mean of dep. var. 0.0346 0.0346 0.0346 0.0340 0.0340 0.0340
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if migrated to the United States between 
2002 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are quintiles of predicted log earnings and wages. These are 
constructed by regressing annual earnings or hourly wages on 5 education categories (in columns 1 and 4), 5 education and 
5 age categories, fully interacted (in columns 2 and 5), and 5 education, 5 age, and 4 cognitive ability categories, fully 
interacted (in columns 3 and 6). The omitted quintile is the 1st (bottom) quintile of predicted earnings or wages. All 
regressions are for Mexican males aged 21 to 65, and are unweighted. Source: Mexican Family Life Survey.Table 4: The Association between Residual Earnings/Wages and Migration
dependent variable: migrated to the US
Residual Annual Earnings Residual Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd Quintile
0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
3rd Quintile
-0.002 -0.006 -0.006 0.01 0.007 0
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
4th Quintile
-0.003 -0.006 -0.01 0.004 0 -0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
5th Quintile
-0.016** -0.015* -0.021*** 0 -0.002 -0.004
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
Residualizing variables:
Education XX X XXX
Education*Age X X X X
Education*Age*Ability XX
Sample size 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826
Mean of dep. var. 0.0346 0.0346 0.0346 0.0340 0.0340 0.0340
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if migrated to the United 
States between 2002 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are quintiles of residual log earnings and 
wages. These are constructed by regressing annual earnings or hourly wages on 5 education categories (in columns 1 
and 4), 5 education and 5 age categories, fully interacted (in columns 2 and 5), and 5 education, 5 age, and 4 cognitive 
ability categories, fully interacted (in columns 3 and 6). The omitted quintile is the 1st (bottom) quintile of predicted 
earnings or wages. All regressions are for Mexican males aged 21 to 65, and are unweighted. Source: Mexican Family 
Life Survey.Table 5: The Association between Predicted Earnings/Wages and Migration with Additional Controls
dependent variable: migrated to the US
Panel A: Predicted Annual Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd Quintile
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.019** 0.019 0.013
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.011]
3rd Quintile
0.016** 0.011 0.018** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.021*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.010]
4th Quintile
0.018** 0.009 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.045** 0.023
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.017]
5th Quintile
0.003 -0.008 0.007 0.031*** 0.053** 0.018






Community fixed effects X
Sample size 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826
Panel B: Predicted Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd Quintile
0.003 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.015 0.009
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.009]
3rd Quintile
0.015* 0.01 0.017** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.022**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.010]
4th Quintile
0.023*** 0.011 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.027*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.016] [0.014]
5th Quintile
0 -0.009 0.004 0.025*** 0.052** 0.022




Community fixed effects X
Sample size 5,608 5,608 5,608 5,608 5,608 5,608Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if migrated to the United 
States between 2002 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are quintiles of predicted log earnings and 
wages, constructed by regressing annual earnings or hourly wages on 5 education, 5 age, and 4 cognitive ability 
categories, fully interacted. Column 2 "cost" controls include: marital status, relative in the U.S., visited the U.S., having 
U.S. documentation, and thought about moving to the U.S. Column 3 "credit" controls include: household assets, ability to 
borrow, having savings. Column 4 adds 150 community level fixed effects. Column 5 includes a variable capturing 
differential returns between Mexico and the U.S. by 25 education*age categories, and is clustered on these education*age 
categories. All regressions are for Mexican males aged 21 to 65, and are unweighted. Source: Mexican Family Life 
Survey.Table 6: The Assocation between Residual Earnings/Wages and Migration with Additional Controls
dependent variable: migrated to the US
Panel A: Residualized Annual Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd Quintile
-0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
3rd Quintile
-0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
4th Quintile
-0.01 -0.011 -0.01 0.001
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
5th Quintile
-0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.009
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
"Cost" controls X
"Credit" controls X
Community fixed effects X
Sample size 5,826 5,826 5,826 5,826
Panel B: Predicted Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd Quintile
0.004 0.001 0.004 0.01
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
3rd Quintile
0 -0.004 0 0.011
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
4th Quintile
-0.004 -0.006 -0.003 0.008
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
5th Quintile
-0.004 -0.006 -0.002 0.007
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
"Cost" controls X
"Credit" controls X
Community fixed effects X
Sample size 5,608 5,608 5,608 5,608
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if migrated to the United 
States between 2002 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are quintiles of residual log earnings and 
wages, constructed by regressing annual earnings or hourly wages on 5 education, 5 age, and 4 cognitive ability 
categories, fully interacted. Column 2 "cost" controls include: marital status, relative in the U.S., visited the U.S., having 
U.S. documentation, and thought about moving to the U.S. Column 3 "credit" controls include: household assets, ability 
to borrow, having savings. Column 4 adds 150 community level fixed effects. All regressions are for Mexican males aged 
21 to 65, and are unweighted. Source: Mexican Family Life Survey.Appendix Table 1: Robustness checks for Predicted Earnings/Wages 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.012 0.009 0.006 0.006 0 -0.002
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
0.009 0.006 0.019** 0.014* 0.020** 0.018**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
0.001 0 0.014* 0.005 0.005 0.001
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
-0.009 -0.012* 0.001 -0.01 -0.01 -0.011*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
"Cost" controls XX X
Sample size 5819 5819 4661 4661 5093 5093
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.012 0.009 0 -0.002 0 -0.001
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
0.009 0.006 0.018** 0.013 0.020** 0.015*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
0.013* 0.01 0.016* 0.006 0.016** 0.012
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
-0.011* -0.013* 0.001 -0.009 -0.011* -0.013**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
"Cost" controls XX X
Sample size 5606 5606 4526 4526 4947 4947
No-proxied hourly wages Monthly-based hourly 
No-proxied annual  No-imputed annual 
No-imputed hourly wages
Panel B: Predicted Hourly wages
4th Quintile
5th Quintile
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if migrated to the 
United States between 2002 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are quintiles of predicted and 
residual log earnings and wages. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include controls for marital status, relative in the U.S., visited 
the U.S., having U.S. documentation, and thought about moving to the U.S. All regressions are for Mexican males 
aged 21 to 65, and are unweighted. Source: Mexican Family Life Survey.
dependent variable: migrated to the US
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
Panel A: Predicted Earnings
Monthly earnings
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
5th Quintile